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The Role of Occupational
Pension Plans in an Optimal
Polish Pension System
Marek Szczepański
Poznań University of Technology
In spite of a radical and comprehensive reform of the public pension 
system in Poland that took place in 1999,1 an adequate and sustainable 
retirement income for Polish citizens remains a major challenge. 
This chapter focuses on occupational pension plans and their role 
in the current and in an optimal pension system in Poland. The current, 
relatively new pension system is analyzed and evaluated in terms of its 
three main goals: 1) improving coverage, 2) sharing risks, and 3) pro-
viding adequate benefi ts. The analysis of the current system then leads 
to conclusions about the role of employer-sponsored pension plans in 
an ideal Polish pension system. 
INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE OF THE NEW 
PENSION SYSTEM 
The institutional architecture of the Polish pension system is com-
plicated. Since the implementation of pension reform in 1999, two 
statutory employee pension systems have been operating in Poland: 
the old one, which is organized on a pay-as-you-go defi ned benefi t 
basis, and a new, multi-pillar pension system, organized on a defi ned 
contribution basis (Figure 10.1). The new multi-pillar pension system 
consists of 1) a state-run pay-as-you-go Notional Defi ned Contribution 
(NDC) fi rst pillar, 2) a fully funded second pillar (so-called open-ended 
pension funds, or OFEs, managed by private, commercial institutions) 
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with a fi nancial defi ned contribution formula,2 and 3) a voluntary third 
pillar (employee pension plans, PPEs, and personal pension accounts, 
IKEs). The old system will cease to operate in 2034. 
The new pension system is based entirely on individual accounts, 
with annuitization of account values at retirement. It is fi nancially neu-
tral and actuarially balanced and should be, according to the reform 
leaders, much more effective and fair than the old system. The new 
pension system is not redistributive across generations and will not re-
sult in hidden public debt. The reform package has been described as 
achieving “security through diversity.” 
In theory, the new statutory pension system in Poland looks very 
good. Twelve years after the implementation of this reform, some ad-
vantages are obvious, but there are also many shortcomings and risks 
connected with the new system. 
Barr and Diamond (2010, p. 26) stated that a pension system should 
accomplish two core purposes: 1) “offer a mechanism for consumption 
smoothing . . . and provide insurance against low income and wealth in 
old age” and 2) “relieve poverty and redistribute income and wealth.” 
A well-designed pension system should therefore not only guarantee 
protection from poverty, but also income maintenance. With an ex-
pected gross replacement rate of about 60 percent for men and 40 per-
cent for women in Poland, only relief from poverty can be achieved 
under the current system (Szumlicz 2005, p. 266; OECD 2011). The 
average earnings in Poland are only about 1/3 of the average earnings 
for EU-27,3 and the gross replacement rate of 40–60 percent does not 
guarantee a decent level of retirement income.
According to the analysis prepared for the European Commission 
(2010), Poland belongs to the group of EU-27 members with the largest 
expected decline in net replacement rates from the public pension social 
security system. Also the benefi t ratio (the average benefi t from public 
and private pensions as a share of the economy-wide average wage) 
will fall from 56 percent in 2007 to 31 percent in 2060 (European Com-
mission and Economic Policy Committee 2009). 
The design of the new statutory pension system is favorable for 
people with long uninterrupted careers, but it is particularly poorly de-
signed for atypical workers and generally poor for women. The new 
statutory pension system increases the risk of social exclusion for many 
groups, including people who experience unemployment (the current 
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unemployment rate in 2011 is 13 percent), part-time workers, freelance 
workers, and temporary workers. The system also increases the risk of 
inadequate pensions for a considerable number of workers with stable, 
long-term employment but with below average incomes. There is no 
intragenerational redistribution or solidarity between high-wage and 
low-wage workers (as used to exist in the old pay-as-you-go pension 
system through the defi ned benefi t formula). Low levels of actuarially
strict mandatory defi ned contribution benefi ts inevitably will lead to 
low-wage workers receiving low or very low pensions, quite often 
the minimum guaranteed pension. Even entrepreneurs and the self-
employed can expect limited benefi ts from the new statutory pension 
system because most of them declare only the lowest level of pension 
contributions calculated for minimum wages. As a result, they also will 
Figure 10.1  Design of the Old-Age Pension System in Poland since 1999
           
a On March 25, 2011, the Polish Parliament (Sejm) decided to reduce contributions to 
the funded part of the public pension system from 7.3 percent to 2.3 percent and in-
crease pension contributions to the pay-as-you-go part of the system to 17.22 percent, 
starting May 1, 2011. The defi ned contribution pension formula remains unchanged 
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receive very low retirement benefi ts. But even average- or high-wage 
workers will not achieve acceptable income maintenance levels in re-
tirement without additional pension savings. 
PROBLEMS WITH THE VOLUNTARY THIRD PILLAR 
Both the individual and occupational voluntary pension plans are 
fully funded, defi ned contribution plans offered in various forms (see 
Table 10.1), but insuffi cient development of these additional plans (es-
pecially the occupational pension plans) appears to be one of the most 
important disadvantages of the Polish reform. The voluntary pension 
systems cover only a small percentage of the labor force: PPEs cover 
only 2 percent and IKEs about 6 percent. Thus, these voluntary pension 
options play only a minor role in pension provision. 
The development of occupational pension plans has been rather 
slow since 1999 (Figure 10.2). The only exception occurred in 2004, 
when many group life insurance programs were transformed into pen-
sion plans when the new Law on Occupational Pensions came into 
effect. But, even in 2004 and afterwards, the development of employer-
sponsored pension plans was not suffi cient to improve coverage. 
In addition, participants in existing occupational pension plans 
organized on a Financial Defi ned Contribution (FDC) basis bear numer-
ous types of fi nancial market risks, and there is no minimum guaranteed 
Life insurance                                       795
Investment fund 285
Company pension fund 33
Foreign management companies 0
Total 1,113
Table 10.1  Number of Occupational Pension Plans in Poland by Plan 
Type, 2010
SOURCE: Pracownicze programy emerytalne w 2010 roku [Occupational pension 
plans in 2010], Polish Financial Supervision Authority (KNF), available at http://
www.knf.gov.pl.
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rate of return for the savers. There is also no mutual insurance fund in 
case of the bankruptcy of the plan sponsor.
Barriers to the Development of Employee Pension Plans
Key barriers to the development of employee pension plans in Po-
land can be divided into exogenous factors of an institutional nature, 
exogenous factors of a noninstitutional nature (primarily macro-
economic determinants), and endogenous factors attributable to the em-
ployer (Szczepański 2010, p. 179). Because employees generally show 
little interest in employee pension plans, the endogenous factors con-
nected with employees play a lesser role in practice and can be regarded 
as secondary factors infl uencing the development of employee pension 
plans.   
1,200







1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Figure 10.2 Development of Occupational Pension Plans in Poland, 
1999–2009
SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on data from the Polish Financial Supervision 
Authority (http://www.knf.gov.pl, accessed June 15, 2010).
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Exogenous institutional factors 
The reformed pension system retained a high level of contributions 
to the obligatory system (the fi rst and second pillars, which together 
receive nearly 20 percent of salaries), leaving limited space for the 
development of supplementary systems, including employee pension 
plans. 
In addition, insuffi cient economic and fi scal incentives are offered 
to employers to sponsor the plans and to employees to join them. Es-
pecially problematic are the lack of an income tax allowance for plan 
participants who pay voluntary supplemental premiums and an unat-
tractive capital gains tax allowance whose threshold is too high and 
inaccessible for employees with medium and lower incomes.
There is also little fl exibility and limited selection of institutional 
forms of administering employee pension plans. This includes the in-
ability to administer an employee pension plan as a defi ned benefi t plan 
or a hybrid plan. Those types of plans allow a more balanced division 
of investment risk and other types of risks among employers, employ-
ees, and fi nancial services suppliers than is available under the current 
Polish system. This has led to the phenomenon of institutionally driven 
nonoptimal risk allocation. A more fl exible market-based system theo-
retically would reduce transaction costs.
Plan participants are given insuffi cient legal and institutional dis-
closures about currently executed strategies in asset management and 
the levels of risks related to these strategies. This has led to information 
asymmetry, as described in agency theory, between plan participants 
and the fi nancial institutions hired to manage employee pension plans. 
In addition, there is little institutional support for helping current and 
potential employee pension plan participants and employers to compare 
offers from fi nancial services providers in terms of costs and investment 
results.
There are no institutional solutions protecting the interests of 
participants in different age groups. Older and younger age groups (de-
mographic cohorts) have different needs in employee pension plans. 
One institutional solution could take the form of subfunds that invest 
in safe assets to which pension savings would be transferred in a speci-
fi ed time period, such as 5 years before the employee is 60 years old or 
is eligible to receive benefi ts. Another solution is the use of packages 
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of properly selected pension funds within employee pension plans, en-
suring an optimal allocation of premiums for participants in different 
life-cycle phases, taking into account individual needs and approaches
to risk. Such a role could be played by aggressive funds, aimed at 
younger people, that have a higher proportion of more risky but poten-
tially more profi table assets, balanced funds, and more conservative but 
potentially less profi table funds. Multi-fund solutions could play the 
role of automatic stabilizers, reducing the risk of erroneous selection of 
a fund by plan participants who generally have to select one of several 
investment funds available in employee pension plans or unit-linked 
insurance plans. This would be particularly helpful to people who do 
not want to choose a fund on their own. 
Other barriers to the development of employee pensions include:
• An inability to differentiate the amount of the basic premium 
paid to employee pension plans by the employer for employ-
ees. This makes it diffi cult to use qualifi ed pension plans as an 
effi cient salary policy instrument or incentive factor.
• Unresolved legal and institutional issues connected with the 
creation of employee pension plans in institutions belonging to 
public fi nance. 
• The lack of regular and wide-scale educational activities about 
employee pension plans managed by state institutions. 
• A lack of requirements for fi nancial results of institutions ser-
vicing employee pension plans. Such requirements could be 
modeled after solutions used in other countries, where a mini-
mum return rate is specifi ed (e.g., with reference to the infl ation 
rate or other external macroeconomic parameters).
• An insuffi cient level of coordination of transferability of ben-
efi ts or pension entitlements between employee pension plans 
existing in different countries, at least within the EU. 
• An insuffi cient level of coordination related to the security of 
employee pension plan participants in the EU. For example, 
there are no unifi ed requirements of fi nancial service providers 
for such plans and the requirements specifi ed in EU directives 
are too general and interpreted in different ways in different 
countries.
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Exogenous noninstitutional factors 
Poland has a high unemployment rate, and most employers are not 
interested in taking on additional fi nancial obligations aimed at retain-
ing employees. One such obligation would be creation of an employee 
pension plan.
In general high costs have been associated with the adaptation ac-
tivities connected with the transformation of Poland’s economic system. 
Entrepreneurs have been focused on gaining and maintaining market 
share and face ever-increasing competition connected with Poland’s 
entry into the EU. Other issues, including supplementary employee 
benefi ts such as an employee pension plan, have presumably been of 
secondary importance. Workers in Poland already have a signifi cantly 
lower average salary as compared to the EU average, which has resulted
in relatively low levels of average disposable income and average 
household savings.
Finally, the global fi nancial crisis negatively infl uenced the invest-
ment results of fi nancial institutions that service employee pension 
plans as well as the value of assets accumulated in the plans. 
Endogenous employer-related factors 
In general there is little competitive pressure for employers to 
provide pensions because most businesses do not offer these types of 
nonwage benefi ts to their employees. Therefore, employers do not feel 
obliged to bear the additional costs of creating employee pension plans. 
There is also insuffi cient pressure from employees and their organiza-
tions to force employers to create pension plans.
Employee pension plans are nonwage long-term incentives that do 
not directly infl uence labor productivity growth. Instead, they improve 
the working environment and relations between employers and em-
ployees, help build loyalty and employee attachment to the company, 
but they do not, at least in the short and medium term, increase fi nan-
cial benefi ts (e.g., profi ts or growth in company market value) for the 
employer. 
The employee pension plans are also infl exible in terms of employee
compensation and administration. As stated previously, employers do 
not have the fl exibility to shape the amount of the employer’s contribu-
tion so that premiums can be individualized, depending on the appraisal 
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of a given employee. In addition, the employer is obligated to register 
plans with a national supervisory body, which especially discourages 
small- and medium-sized companies with a small staff base. Plan ad-
ministration also poses additional accounting, fi nancial, and human 
resource obligations.
There is an agency problem in the relationship between employers 
fi nancing a plan and the fi nancial institutions managing it, including in-
formation asymmetry and transaction costs connected with sometimes 
suboptimal choices in the plan and the provider. 
Endogenous employee-related factors 
The level of pension awareness is generally low, although recent 
research has shown it to be slowly increasing. In general, people still 
prefer current consumption over savings, particularly people with lower 
incomes. Most employees perceive existing incentives to participate in 
employee pension plans (highlighted above in the discussion of institu-
tional barriers) as too weak, and for many individuals, participation is 
simply unaffordable.4
The awareness of the risk connected with investing in fi nancial mar-
kets has grown as has awareness of the differences in interests between 
plan participants and the fi nancial institutions managing the plans. To 
date, these factors have not had a signifi cant infl uence on the develop-
ment of employee pension plans, but they may become a barrier in the 
development of employee pension plans in Poland unless new solutions 
to limit risk to employees are introduced to the plan structure.
Variables Stimulating the Development of Employee
Pension Plans
Exogenous institutional factors 
Legal, institutional, and administrative factors related to employee 
pension plans have evolved in the past decade and helped with plan 
formation. Employers were allowed limited engagement in plans and 
to exit them in the case of deterioration of a company’s fi nancial stand-
ing. Restrictive penalties were lifted for failing to observe formalities 
connected with the registration and administration of a plan. The legal 
changes made in 2004 were particularly profound and stimulated em-
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ployee pension plan development. One factor, the expansion of available 
institutional forms of running employee pension plans to permit their 
management from abroad, has not yet helped develop employee pen-
sion plans because no such program has yet been registered. During 
the same period, regulations were adopted governing the operations of 
fi nancial institutions providing employee pension plan services to meet 
EU legal requirements, which increased the security of the fi nancial 
operations and asset management. 
Tax relief was withdrawn for unqualifi ed pension plans, which had 
been run in the form of group life insurance programs or payments into 
investment funds. This was an incentive for some companies to convert 
them into qualifi ed employee pension plans. 
At the same time, the base portion of the reformed pension system 
was defi ned. The new system uses different methods of fi nancing and 
pension capital accumulation in the base portion (both the pay-as-you-
go and the funded systems). The system assumes that future benefi ts 
should come from at least two obligatory segments and that benefi ts 
should be supplemented by additional savings accumulated in the third 
pillar (i.e., in employee pension plans and in individual retirement ac-
counts). Understood narrowly, the third pillar is limited to systems of 
supplementary pension savings covered by systemic fi scal and social 
incentives offered by the state, but the third pillar is an integral part of 
the new system. 
Exogenous noninstitutional factors 
A factor that might have contributed to the creation of employee 
pension plans at least in some sectors of the economy (e.g., in con-
struction and transportation) was the increased possibility of economic 
migration to other EU states (particularly after Poland’s entry into the 
EU in 2004) and the desire to keep employees in Poland by offering 
them additional benefi ts. However, analyses show that there is no clear 
positive correlation between periodic economic migration and an in-
crease of employee pension plan participants (Szczepański 2010, p. 
377). Entrepreneurs that wanted to retain current or recruit new employ-
ees to replace the ones who went abroad seemed to use other methods, 
particularly salary increases.
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European integration, which included the creation of jobs in Po-
land in companies with foreign capital or in international corporations, 
contributed slightly to the creation of company pension plans (both 
qualifi ed and nonqualifi ed plans). Foreign employers running em-
ployee pension plans were mainly driven by non-economic motivations 
(e.g., organizational culture, corporate social responsibility, and image) 
rather than by fi scal or cost incentives because the latter in Poland are 
very modest as compared to other countries. Because of the low level 
of fl exibility and an inability to individualize base premiums paid by the 
employer, many domestic and foreign employers preferred to start non-
qualifi ed plans,5 which gave them more freedom in shaping this form of 
nonwage employee benefi ts.
Finally, competition among fi nancial institutions providing fi nan-
cial services for employee pension plans was stronger than in the capital 
segment of the public pension system. There was a much higher num-
ber of competing entities, leading to more differentiation of premiums 
and investment results.
Endogenous employer-related factors 
Employers generally had an overall positive assessment of many 
aspects of employee pension plans, including their structure, legal limi-
tations, and relaxed administrative oversight. The general structure of 
employee pension plans as defi ned by statute was viewed positively, as 
was the quality of service provided by fi nancial institutions servicing 
employee pension plans. Also viewed positively were legal and insti-
tutional changes that allow premium limits, temporary suspension of 
the payment of premiums, and the possibility of plan liquidation if the 
company’s fi nancial standing deteriorates. Employers also supported 
the reduced supervision by state institutions.
The awareness of nonwage remuneration elements has gradually 
grown, as have the opportunities to use them as an instrument in human 
resource management policy. The concept of corporate social respon-
sibility in company management has also become stronger. Many 
employers stated that their desire to ensure supplementary pension se-
curity for employees as an element of this social responsibility was a 
decisive factor when starting a plan.
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Endogenous employee-related factors
The fact that the base premium in the plan is paid by the employer 
is viewed positively by employees. There has been a high participation 
rate (70–80 percent) in employee pension plans in the few companies 
that have plans. Awareness of the need for pensions and of the need to 
accumulate supplementary savings for old age has grown, especially 
among younger and better educated people. Although it generally oc-
curs too late for individuals to accumulate suffi cient supplementary 
savings, the fear of a decline in one’s fi nancial standing after retirement 
can contribute to an employee’s desire to be part of a pension plan.
Since the implementation of pension reform in Poland in 1999, 
there generally have been more barriers than stimulants to the devel-
opment of employee pension plans. It is therefore not surprising that 
development has been slow and limited and that such a small share of 
employees is covered.
THE IDEAL PENSION SYSTEM IN POLAND
The ideal, or at least the optimal, Polish pension system should 
guarantee more secure and adequate income for future retirees. But an 
adequate income should also be combined with the long-term sustain-
ability of the system and better protection of pension rights, especially 
for women and people with atypical work careers.
The general idea of the 1999 pension reform, risk diversifi cation 
between the labor and the fi nancial markets (Security Through Di-
versity), should be retained. The institutional architecture of the new 
statutory pension system, consisting of two separate, individual pension 
accounts with defi ned contribution formulas (in the pay-as-you-go fi rst 
pillar and the fully funded second pillar) also should be retained. This 
multi-pillar approach should ensure long-term sustainability, and the 
defi ned contribution formula should guarantee actuarial adjustment of 
the pension system. A separate issue is the insuffi cient development of 
the voluntary pension plans in the third pillar.
The new statutory pension system in Poland is actuarially balanced, 
and this is an important achievement that should neither be disregarded 
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nor discarded. Nevertheless, many changes should to be introduced 
to improve adequacy and risk sharing in that system. The following 
changes should enable the Polish pension system to achieve the fol-
lowing goals: improved coverage, improved adequacy, and greater 
mitigation of fi nancial market and cohort risks. 
Improved Coverage 
The ideal Polish pension system should be based not only on a com-
pulsory (statutory) pension system (divided into two pillars), but also 
on occupational pension plans for the majority of workers, especially 
low-wage workers. The extremely low coverage rates for voluntary 
occupational and individual pension plans in Poland (the third pillar) 
illustrate the need for a new approach to the design of old-age pension 
plans. Attractive tax incentives, especially personal income tax exemp-
tions, could be too expensive and create negative microeconomic side 
effects. Therefore, automatic enrollment of workers into occupational 
pension plans with an opt-out option seems to be a more promising 
solution. High-wage workers should have more opportunities to engage 
in individual pension savings. The existing individual savings accounts, 
which typically are in the form of separate bank accounts, investment 
funds, life insurance, or brokerage accounts should be supplemented 
with new fi nancial products dedicated to long-term savings for older 
persons. For lower income individuals and those with atypical working 
careers, a zero pillar should be created that is tax fi nanced, with benefi ts 
at a higher level than the current minimum guaranteed pensions.
Improved Adequacy 
To improve the adequacy of future pensions without increasing 
pension benefi ts, the statutory retirement age of women (currently 
60) should be equalized with that of men (currently 65). To stimulate 
competition and better performance in the funded second pillar of the 
statutory pension system, fees and charges should be capped and the use 
of internal benchmarks should be eliminated. Fees and charges should 
be connected to investment results. The best-performing pension funds 
should be rewarded with a “success” fee. In addition, OFEs should not 
have the right to aggressively advertise for participants. 
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Mitigation of Financial Market and Cohort Risks 
The risks connected with the investments of pension plans should 
be mitigated, especially in the statutory pension system. The oldest co-
horts of participants in the OFEs should be enrolled into sub-funds that 
invest in less risky fi nancial assets (e.g., participants within 5 to 10 
years of retirement age). Young participants in OFEs should be offered 
more investment options, with more or less aggressive and potentially 
profi table fi nancial asset portfolios. Participants who do not want to 
make their own investment choices should be enrolled into low-risk, 
age-appropriate funds. All participants should be provided with more 
information than is currently available regarding investment strategies, 
risks, and potential profi ts and losses connected with particular funds. 
Participants in occupational pension plans should also have more 
infl uence on investment choices and strategies of the fi nancial institu-
tions that provide the services for workplace pensions. The participants 
should receive comprehensive, up-to-date information about risks 
and potential profi ts and losses connected with different kinds of in-
vestments. A special guarantee fund should be created in case of the 
bankruptcy of the employer sponsoring the plan. Because of the pro-
posed quasi-obligatory status of the occupational pension plans, the 
cost of insurance against employer bankruptcy would be limited. 
An Alternative Approach 
An alternative and more drastic approach would involve the liq-
uidation of the compulsory fully funded second pillar and a return to 
a one-pillar statutory pay-as-you-go pension system with more incen-
tives for additional pension plans (occupational and individual savings 
for retirement). Such a modifi ed statutory pension system, with pay-
as-you-go fi nancing of a notional defi ned contribution benefi t as the 
fi rst pillar, fully funded defi ned contribution occupational pension 
plans as the second pillar, and voluntary fully funded defi ned contri-
bution personal pension plans as the third pillar, would be safer for 
participants because such a system would reduce the fi nancial market 
risks in the statutory pension system. Such a solution would be dif-
fi cult to implement, however, and very expensive. The institutions that 
currently manage OFEs would most likely sue the Polish government 
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and demand compensation for the lost profi ts that would result from 
implementation of this scheme. In addition, opinion polls show that 
most Polish citizens prefer a multi-pillar pension system with a fully 
funded component over a one-pillar statutory pension system with vol-
untary additional plans. Bad experiences with unfavorable changes in 
pension rights and entitlements in the old pension system and different 
indexation rates of individual accounts in the state-managed fi rst pillar 
of the new system have provoked this lack of confi dence. A multi-pillar 
system with a funded component and a mechanism to reduce fi nancial 
market risks would generally be much better perceived and accepted 
in Poland than a one-pillar system with a high degree of political risk. 
From the Polish perspective, it seems to be more aligned with the Polish 
mentality and experiences, and closer to the ideal system design. 
Generally, Poles do not trust policymakers, prefer to accept fi nan-
cial market risks rather than political risk in the pension system, and 
do not want to be entirely dependent on state institutions for their re-
tirement income. When imaging the ideal Polish pension system, one 
should take these preferences into consideration. 
Notes
1. In March 2011, 12 years after the implementation of pension reform, some im-
portant elements of pension design have been changed. The amount of pension 
contributions to the funded part of the new system has been reduced from 7.3 
percent to 2.3 percent, and the amount of pension contributions paid to the pay-
as-you-go part of the system has been increased (see note to Fig. 10.1). New 
incentives for additional, voluntary pension savings will be offered beginning 
January 1, 2012. 
2. The old pay-as-you-go pension plan applies to people older than 50 on the fi rst 
day of the enforcement of the reform (January 1, 1999), and the new one applies 
to those who were 50 or younger as of that date. Participants in the new pension 
system are subdivided into two groups: 1) people below the age of 30, who have 
compulsory coverage in both public and private plans, and 2) people aged 30–50, 
who can choose whether to remain in the NDC plan only or to take part in both 
tiers. 
3. According to Eurostat, the average monthly full-time equivalent gross earnings in 
EU Member States in 2006 was €1,695, whereas it was €573 in Poland. Annual 
income data presented in OECD (2011) confi rm this relation.
4. There was an exemption from capital gains tax of supplementary premiums paid 
into employee pension plans up to PLN12,000 in 2008. The average disposable 
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income per person in a household was about PLN1,000 (monthly) during the 
same period, and average spending was PLN900 (monthly). So an average earner 
clearly gains little benefi t from the capital gains tax exemption. That tax incentive 
is much more favorable for high-income workers who are much more likely to 
save more and make full use of this tax incentive. 
5. It is diffi cult to give the exact number of nonqualifi ed employee pension plans 
because there is no nationwide register of such plans. Qualifi ed plans are listed in 
a register maintained by a central state administration body. 
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